LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources
Volume 9
Issue 2 Spring 2021
5-5-2022

Contra Proferentem in the Oilpatch? The “Against the Lessee”
Rule of Lease Construction
Byron C. Keeling

Repository Citation
Byron C. Keeling, Contra Proferentem in the Oilpatch? The “Against the Lessee” Rule of Lease
Construction, 9 LSU J. of Energy L. & Resources (2022)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol9/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor
of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Contra Proferentem in the Oilpatch? The “Against the
Lessee” Rule of Lease Construction
Byron C. Keeling ∗
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................. 346
I.

The Rules of Contract Construction:
The Context of the “Against the Lessee”
Rule of Construction ................................................................. 347

II.

The Progenitor of the “Against the Lessee” Rule:
The Contra Proferentem Rule of Construction........................... 352

III. Misuse of the “Against the Lessee” Rule of Construction:
The Example of First Marketable Product Case Law ................. 361
A. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co. ........................................... 365
B. Estate of Tawney v.
Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C. ................................... 368
IV. A Return to Its Contra Proferentem Roots:
The Proper Scope of the “Against the Lessee”
Rule of Construction ................................................................. 373
A. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should
Be a Rule of Last Resort ..................................................... 374
B. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should
Apply Only If the Lessee is the Drafter ............................... 378
C. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should
Not Apply if the Lessor is Sophisticated .............................. 382
Conclusion ................................................................................ 385

Copyright 2021, by BYRON C. KEELING.
∗ Shareholder, Keeling & Fredrickson, P.C., Houston, Texas. B.A., J.D.,
Baylor University, LL.M., University of Illinois. I am grateful to my colleague,
Anna Fredrickson, for her comments and assistance on this Article.

346

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IX

INTRODUCTION
After Elizabeth Swann invoked the Pirate’s Code in the first Pirates
of the Caribbean movie, Captain Hector Barbossa responded: “[T]he code
is more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules.”1 As a general rule,
most rules are not hard-and-fast rules. Grade school students learn that
they should place “i before e except after c,” but with enough caffeine and
the weight of experience, they soon discover the weird and ancient truth
that the “i before e except after c” rule is subject to many exceptions. Some
rules are indeed only guidelines. Some rules are indeed subject to many
exceptions. Some rules are subject to so many exceptions that they
effectively apply only in very limited situations.
Law students become familiar with the contra proferentem doctrine—
the rule that courts will construe a contract against the party who drafted
it—in their first year of law school. The contra proferentem doctrine does
not literally mean that all contracts will always be construed in favor of
the non-drafting party. If that were true, then the actual terms of contracts
would be largely meaningless. As law students discover with enough
caffeine and the weight of experience, the contra proferentem doctrine
applies only in very limited circumstances. It applies only to ambiguous
contracts; and even then, it applies only as a last resort—where a court has
no other rule of contract construction available to construe the ambiguous
contract language. 2
Over the years, courts in oil and gas cases have developed a variation
of the contra proferentem doctrine—the rule that courts will construe an
oil and gas lease against the lessee and in favor of the lessor. Yet, while
the “against the lessee” rule of construction evolved from the contra
proferentem doctrine, courts seemingly have treated the “against the
lessee” rule as more of a hard-and-fast rule than it really should be. 3 The
“against the lessee” rule of construction is no justification for courts to
rewrite an oil and gas lease to achieve a result that they may believe to be
more fair or equitable to the lessor. Like the contra proferentem doctrine,
the “against the lessee” rule of lease construction should apply only to
ambiguous contracts, and even then, it should apply only as a last resort.4

1. PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE
Disney Pictures 2003).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.

OF THE

BLACK PEARL (Walt
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I. THE RULES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION: THE CONTEXT OF THE
“AGAINST THE LESSEE” RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
An oil and gas lease is a contract between a lessor and lessee. 5 The
“lessor” in an oil and gas lease is the mineral owner—i.e., the party who
owns the rights to the oil or gas under a tract of property. 6 The “lessee,”
commonly an oil and gas producer or developer, is the party who hopes to
recover and produce the oil or gas from the ground. 7 Under a typical oil
and gas lease, the lessor gives the lessee not only the contractual right to
explore for and produce oil, gas, or other minerals, but also a property
interest in the minerals themselves.8 The lessee, in turn, agrees to pay the
lessor royalties on any oil, gas, or other minerals that the lessee may
produce from the lease.9
Generally, an oil and gas lease is subject to the same rules of
construction as any other kind of contract. 10 The first and foremost rule of
5. See Jack O’Neill & Byron C. Keeling, Valuation of Oil Royalties: From
the Perspective of the Payor, 47 PROC. ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS L. & TAX’N
§ 6.05[1], at 6-41 (1996) (“An oil and gas lease is a contract, and as such, it is
subject to the general principles of contract law.”); see also Bi-County Props. v.
Wampler, 378 N.E.2d 311, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Baker v. Mangum Hunter
Prod., Inc., 473 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Ky. 2015); Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co.,
136 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. 2016); Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348
S.W.3d 194, 210 (Tex. 2011).
6. See 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL
AND GAS TERMS 580 (9th ed. 1994).
7. Id. at 579.
8. David E. Pierce, Incorporating a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
Into the “Modern” Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 788–89 (1994);
see Dayna Ferebee, Comment, Handshakes and Heartaches: Who Owns the Oil
After Rogers v. Ricane?, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 129, 130-31 (1995) (“The oil
and gas lease, like a conveyance, transfers an interest in property, but like a
contract, contains conditions and covenants.”).
9. Jefferson D. Stewart & David F. Maron, Post-Production Charges to
Royalty Interests: What Does the Contract Say and When Is It Ignored?, 70 MISS.
L.J. 625, 628 (2000).
10. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, A New Era of Royalty
Accounting: Practical Advice for the Payor, 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. J.
15, 16 (2007); see D.R. Lauck Oil Co. v. Breitenbach, 893 P.2d 286, 288 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1995); Moerman v. Prairie Res., Inc., 308 P.3d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013);
Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005); Moncrief v.
Harvey, 816 P.2d 97, 103 (Wyo. 1991); see also Valentina Williston, LLC v.
Gadeco, LLC, 878 N.W.2d 397, 401 (N.D. 2016) (“The same general rules that
govern interpretation of contractual agreements apply to oil and gas leases.”);
Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 71 N.E.3d 1010, 1013 (Ohio 2016)
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contract construction is that a court must seek to give effect to the intent
of the parties. 11 As Professor Bruce Kramer has observed, “[i]ntent is the
polestar of any judicial interpretation of a written instrument.”12 If the
parties’ intent is obvious on the face of a contract, then a court has no need
to resort to any other rule of contract construction. 13 Thus, if a contract,
such as an oil and gas lease, is unambiguous, a court must enforce it as it
is written.14 A court may enforce an unambiguous oil and gas lease as a
matter of law. 15
As with any other kind of contract, a court should give the terms of an
oil and gas lease their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning.16
(“[A]n oil and gas lease is a contract that is subject to the traditional rules of
contract construction.”); Matthew J. Salzman & Aaron K. Friess, Royalty
Clauses: What is Everyone Fighting About (and How Do I Avoid It)?, in
DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING THE MODERN OIL AND GAS LEASE 7-3, 7-10
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 2018) (“An oil and gas lease is, first and foremost, a
contractual agreement. It is subject to the general rules governing contract
interpretation.”).
11. See, e.g., Owens v. Superior Oil Co., 730 P.2d 458, 459 (N.M. 1986);
State ex rel. Comm’rs of Land Office v. Couch, 298 P.2d 452, 453 (Okla. 1956);
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002); see
also Daniel B. Kostrub & Roger S. Christenson II, Canons of Construction for the
Interpretation of Mineral Conveyances, Severances, Exceptions, and
Reservations in Producing States, 88 N.D. L. REV. 645, 652 (2012) (“Courts today
uniformly follow a golden rule of contract interpretation: a court will construe a
written instrument to give effect to the clear intent expressed by the parties when
they entered the contract.”).
12. Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 55
(1993).
13. Id.; see Fast v. Kahan, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971) (“The provision in
question is common in oil and gas leases. It is plain, unambiguous, and means just
what it says. Hence, there is no room for application of rules of construction.”).
14. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 16; see Meisler v. Gull Oil, Inc.,
848 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Key Gas Corp., 124 P.3d
96, 102 (2005); Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1981);
Flanagan v. Stalnaker, 607 S.E.2d 765, 770 (W. Va. 2004).
15. See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons, 299 P.3d 844, 849 (N.M. 2012);
TSB Exco, Inc. v. E.N. Smith, III Energy Corp., 818 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tex. App.
1991); Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143 (W. Va. 2003); see also
Kramer, supra note 12, at 13 (“The issue of whether or not there is an ambiguity
is a question of law for the court.”).
16. See, e.g., Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 772
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Hanners v. Giant Oil Co., 284 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Ark. 2008);
Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tex. App. 2002).
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And when a lease uses technical terms that are common in the oil and gas
business, a court should give those terms their common technical
meaning. 17 An oil and gas lease is not ambiguous simply because the
parties disagree about the meaning of its terms.18 To the contrary, a lease
is ambiguous only if—after giving its terms their plain, ordinary, and
generally accepted meaning—the lease is reasonably susceptible to two or
more different interpretations. 19
If a lease is truly ambiguous, then the parties may offer extrinsic
evidence to prove their intent at the time that they entered into the lease.20
Such extrinsic evidence may include not only subjective testimony about
the parties’ understanding of the disputed terms, but also any other
evidence relevant to the parties’ intent—such as, for example,
correspondence between the parties memorializing their negotiations over
the terms of the lease. 21 It may also include (i) evidence of a prior course
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1981); see David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in
Oil & Gas Litigation, 57 SMU L. REV. 387, 402 (2004); Schroeder v. Terra
Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); PNP Petroleum I, LP
v. Taylor, 438 S.W.3d 723, 736 (Tex. App. 2014); see also Heritage Res., Inc. v.
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (“If a lease term has a generally
accepted meaning in the oil and gas industry, we use its generally accepted
meaning.”); 2 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS ON OIL AND GAS § 16:2 (3d ed.
2016) (“The technical words in an oil and gas lease are to be interpreted as they
are usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they
relate, unless there is evidence that the words were used in a different sense.”);
Salzman & Friess, supra note 10, at 7-11 (“It is a widely-recognized practice for
courts to acknowledge ‘terms of art’ for particular industries when interpreting
[an] industry contract containing such terms in order to accurately deduce the
parties’ intent. A corollary to that practice is taking into consideration the
established industry custom and practice and the prevailing law at the time the
contract was executed.”).
18. See, e.g., Dynegy Midstream Servs., L.P. v. Apache Corp., 294 S.W.3d
164, 168 (Tex. 2009); Flanagan v. Stalnaker, 607 S.E.2d 765, 769 (W. Va. 2004).
19. See, e.g., Jacobs, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 772; Heritage Res., Inc., 939 S.W.2d
at 121; see also Souders v. Montana Power Co., 662 P.2d 289, 290 (Mont. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Maverick Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barberton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 872 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Panhandle Co-op. Royalty Co.
v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 115 (Okla. 1971); Souders, 662 P.2d at 290;
Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. Questar Expl. & Prod. Co., 78 P.3d
679, 682 (Wyo. 2003); see also SAINT-PAUL, supra note 17, at § 16:5 (“[I]f the
terms of the lease are ambiguous, a court may consider parole evidence to
determine the parties’ intent.”); Kostrub & Christenson, supra note 11, at 654.
21. See, e.g., Roxana Petroleum Corp. v. Corn, 28 F.2d 168, 170 (8th Cir.
1928).
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of dealing between the parties or (ii) evidence of a common industry
custom or practice or a usage of trade. 22 When the parties to an oil and gas
lease offer conflicting evidence of their contractual intent, the meaning of
the disputed terms in their lease is generally a question of fact for a jury or
other finder of fact to answer. 23
If the parties offer no extrinsic evidence of their contractual intent,
then a court may have to apply other rules of contract construction to
divine the meaning of any ambiguous terms in an oil and gas lease. 24 Most
of these rules of construction apply equally to all types of contracts, not
just oil and gas leases. 25 These rules of construction are familiar to
practitioners. For example, a court may reconcile inconsistent terms in a
lease or contract by holding that a specific term controls over a more
general term, 26 or that a handwritten or “non-printed” term prevails over a
printed form term. 27 A court may hold that it must construe a lease or
contract in a way that avoids creating irreconcilable conflicts or rendering
terms meaningless. 28
One rule of construction that is unique to oil and gas practice is the
“against the lessee” rule, which holds that a court should construe an oil

22. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 401; see also Salzman & Friess, supra note
10, at 7-11 (“It is a widely-recognized practice for courts to acknowledge ‘terms of
art’ for particular industries when interpreting industry contract[s] containing such
terms in order to accurately deduce the parties’ intent. A corollary to that practice is
taking into consideration the established industry custom and practice . . . .”).
23. Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778, 780–81 (N.D. 1984);
see Jacobs, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (“[T]he finder of fact resolves conflicts in
parole or extrinsic evidence submitted to resolve a dispute.”).
24. E.g., West v. Russell, 90 Cal. Rptr. 772, 774 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); see
Kostrub & Christenson, supra note 11, at 651 (“[W]hen properly applied by the
courts, canons arise at a distinct stage in the decision making process to resolve
irreconcilable ambiguities in the words of a contract, once the actual intent of the
parties thereto proves indecipherable.”). Professor Arthur Corbin distinguished
between “interpretation” and “construction.” To interpret a contract, according to
Professor Corbin, was to determine the parties’ intent and understanding. To
construe a contract was to give a legally binding meaning to disputed contract
terms when it was otherwise impossible to interpret them. 3 ARTHUR LINTON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 534 (1960); see Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1109–10 (2006).
25. SAINT-PAUL, supra note 17, at § 16.3.
26. E.g., Kramer, supra note 12, at 85–90.
27. Id. at 96–100.
28. Id. at 73–80.
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and gas lease in favor of the lessor and against the lessee. 29 While unique
to oil and gas practice, the “against the lessee” rule of construction has its
roots in basic contract law. 30 The “against the lessee” rule derives from the
contra proferentem doctrine, a common law rule holding that a court
should construe a contract against the party who drafted it. 31 Consistent
with the contra proferentem doctrine, the “against the lessee” rule rests on
the premise that the lessee is usually the party who drafts an oil and gas
lease. 32
Presumably, the “against the lessee” rule of construction should be
nothing more than a straightforward application of the contra proferentem
doctrine to oil and gas leases. Courts in some states, however, have applied
29. See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 17, at § 16.3 (“The only rule of construction
for oil and gas leases different from the rules employed in the construction and
interpretation of other written instruments is that oil and gas leases are to be
construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee.”).
30. Kramer, supra note 12, at 103.
31. See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 17, at § 16.4 (noting that one of the common
law rules “that led to the traditional construction of oil and gas leases in favor of
the lessor is that where there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to the intent or
meaning of a writing it will be construed against the party preparing the
instrument in question”); David L. Hancock, Note, The Gas Producer’s Dilemma:
Royalty Clauses and Long-Term Purchase Contracts, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 517,
530–31 (1985) (“The general rule has been that oil and gas leases are construed
in favor of the lessor and against the lessee. Not only is this merely the general
rule, it is also embodied in the historical contract maxim of contra proferentem.
This maxim states that a contract is to be interpreted against its profferer or
author.”).
32. See, e.g., Rook v. James E. Petroleum, Inc., 879 P.2d 158, 164 (Kan.
1984) (“Oil and gas leases containing ambiguities are to be strictly construed
against the lessee-producer and in favor of the lessor-royalty owner because the
lessee usually provides the lease form or dictates the terms thereof, and where the
lessee desires it may protect itself by the manner in which the lease is drawn.”);
Freeman v. Samedan Oil Corp., 78 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App. 2001) (noting that the
language in a lease “is generally regarded as that of the lessee”); see also 17
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:57 (4th ed. 2017) (“[A]n oil
and gas lease is often construed most favorably to the lessor because the lessee
usually drafts the lease and has more experience drafting the lease to give itself
an advantage.”); David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA
L.J. 445, 452–53 (1987) (“Courts generally view the oil and gas lease as a contract
drafted by the lessee for the lessee.”); Francis M. Dougherty et al., Preference in
Favor of Lessor or of Lessee, 55 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 177 (Supp. 2017)
(“The preference for the lessor in construing oil and gas leases rests on the fact
that such leases are usually prepared, or standard forms completed, by the lessee
rather than the lessor.”).
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the “against the lessee” rule in a way that goes beyond the historical
limitations of the contra proferentem doctrine.33 Instead of using the
“against the lessee” rule as a tool of last resort to divine the meaning of an
ambiguous lease term, these courts have applied the rule as a means to
create an ambiguity that did not otherwise exist and then construe a lease
against the lessee contrary to its plain and express terms.34
The question is, “Why?” Courts have articulated no justification for
applying the “against the lessee” rule more broadly than the contra
proferentem doctrine. And there is none. The historical limitations on the
contra proferentem doctrine should apply as equally to oil and gas leases
as they do to insurance policies and other forms of contract. 35
II. THE PROGENITOR OF THE “AGAINST THE LESSEE” RULE: THE CONTRA
PROFERENTEM RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
The contra proferentem doctrine has a long history. In the seventeenth
century, Sir Francis Bacon, in his seminal treatise on English common law,
observed that the contra proferentem doctrine was “one of the most
common grounds of the law.” 36 By the early nineteenth century, the
doctrine had found its way into American jurisprudence. 37 In 1932, the
American Law Institute incorporated the contra proferentem doctrine into
its Restatement of Contracts, stating that “[w]here words or other
manifestations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an
interpretation is preferred which operates more strongly against the party
from whom they proceed, unless their use by him is prescribed by law.”38
33. See discussion infra Part III.
34. See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B.
35. David E. Pierce, The Renaissance of Law in the Law of Oil and Gas: The
Contract Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 909, 938 (2004) (“An ‘oil and gas’
contract should be treated no differently from any other type of contract.”).
36. 3 FRANCIS BACON, The Elements of the Common Laws of England, in
THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 225 (London, Longman & Co. ed. 1857); see
Bradley D. Liggett, Comment, Contra Applicatem or Contra Proferentem
Applicatio: The Need for Clarification of the Doctrine of Contra Proferentem in
the Context of Insured-Created Ambiguities in Insurance Applications, 2008
B.Y.U. L. REV. 211, 213–14 (2008).
37. See Liggett, supra note 36, at 214 & n.14 (citing United States v. Heth, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 409 (1806); Duncan v. Cavallos’ Ex’rs, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 571 (La.
1817); Segur v. Syndics of St. Maxent, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 231, 231 (Orleans 1811)).
38. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1932). Even
today, the Restatement continues to reflect the contra proferentem rule. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term
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The contra proferentem doctrine rests on the notion that the party who
drafted a contract should bear the responsibility for any ambiguous
language in the contract. 39 Rightly or wrongly, the doctrine assumes that
the party who drafted a contract controlled the contract’s terms and was in
a better position to clarify or remove any ambiguous language from the
contract. 40 Thus, courts invoking the contra proferentem doctrine have
often justified it on the theory that it discourages poor or careless
draftsmanship, arguing that a drafting party is more likely to prepare a
clearer contract when it knows that a court may construe any ambiguous
language in favor of the other party. 41
thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”).
39. E.g., Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir.
1981); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 n.1 (Tex. 1998).
40. See, e.g., Nw. Adm’rs, Inc. v. B.V. & B.R., Inc., 813 F.2d 223, 226 (9th
Cir. 1987) (“The doctrine of contra proferentem is based on the common sense
notion that ambiguous language should be interpreted against the drafter because
that party was in the best position to prevent the ambiguity . . . .”); see also E.
ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 473–74 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the contra
proferentem rule “is often rationalized on the ground that the party against whom
it operates had the possibility of drafting the language so as to avoid the dispute.”);
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2005) (“The doctrine of contra proferentem may still be a
sensible tiebreaker, on the ground that the party who drafted the contract was
probably in the better position to avoid ambiguities. But this is not always the
case.”).
41. E.g., Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 141 (3d Cir. 1999); MCI
Diagnostic Cen., LLC v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 246, 278 (2020); Twin City
Fire Ins. Co. v. Delaware Racing Ass’n, 840 A.2d 624, 630 (Del. 2003); Snow v.
City of Columbia, 409 S.E.2d 797, 800 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); see Kenneth E.
Dzien & Keith Jonathan Turner, Not All Insurance Policies Are Adhesion
Contracts: A Case Study of the ALTA Loan Title Policy, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 1123,
1130 (1998) (“Historically, the contra proferentem rule was created to encourage
careful contract drafting.”); David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra
Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 437 (2009)
(“The traditional rationale for contra proferentem hinges on control: to deter
ambiguities, courts interpret them against the party responsible for the faulty
language.”); Ethan J. Leib & Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the
Jury in Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 773, 776 (2015) (“Courts and
commentators have offered a variety of rationales for contra proferentem. Perhaps
the dominant explanation is that the rule discourages ambiguity: Drafters will
draft clearer contracts if they know that ambiguous language will be construed
against them.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the “Sophisticated”
Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807,
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Because the contra proferentem doctrine assumes that the drafting
party controlled the contract’s terms, the rule finds its greatest application
in cases where the non-drafting party had little or no ability to negotiate
any of the contract’s terms—particularly insurance cases, where the contra
proferentem doctrine is commonly known as the “ambiguity doctrine.”42
Courts invoking the contra proferentem doctrine in such cases have
offered a further justification for the rule: They argue that it protects
consumers (and other parties who have little or no bargaining power)
against overreaching form contracts and contracts of adhesion.43
The arguments that courts have cited to justify the contra proferentem
doctrine necessarily limit the scope of the rule. Even in insurance cases,
the contra proferentem doctrine does not mean—or, at least, should not
819 (1993) (“[C]ourts construe ambiguous language against the drafter to
encourage clearer, more careful, and precise contract language and place the costs
of uncertainty—that is, litigation losses—on the party better able to bear and
spread the loss.”); Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J.
DISP. RESOL. 149, 178 (“This [contra proferentem] rule incentivizes the drafter to
make the clearest contract possible.”).
The contra proferentem doctrine not only assumes that it serves the present
purpose of deterring careless draftsmanship, but also “that judges will use their
power to induce a rewrite of unsatisfactory contract terms in future contracts.”
Michelle E. Boardman, The Unpredictability of Insurance Interpretation, 82 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 27 (2019) (emphasis in original).
42. See Liggett, supra note 36, at 214; see also David S. Miller, Insurance as
Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1849, 1849 (1988); Ed E. Duncan, The Demise of Contra Proferentem as
the Primary Rule of Insurance Contract Interpretation in Ohio and Elsewhere, 41
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1121, 1121 (2006).
43. E.g., New Castle Cty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 755–56
(3d Cir. 2001); Kunin v. Benefit Tr. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir.
1990); Buchanan v. Mass. Protective Ass’n, 223 F.2d 609, 612–13 (D.C. Cir.
1948); Thompson-Harbach v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 359 F. Supp. 3d 606, 632
(N.D. Iowa 2019); Wismer Distrib. Co. v. Brink’s Inc., No. Civ. A.H-03-5897,
2005 WL 1840149, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2005); Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 866 A.2d 1273, 1280 n.11 (Conn. 2005); Economy Premier
Assurance Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d 749, 754–55 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2013); see 1A PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER &
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:59 (2017) (“To a great degree, the contra
proferentem rule was developed as a means of avoiding the consequences of
contracts that courts felt were either unfair or created on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis
with little real negotiation.”); Leib & Thel, supra note 41, at 776 (noting that
courts have often tried to justify the contra proferentem rule on the basis that it
“serves to protect the public against institutions that are inclined to draft obscure
contracts to entrap consumers”).
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mean—that the insured’s interpretation will always prevail over the
insurer’s interpretation. 44 Where the policies underlying the contra
proferentem doctrine do not apply, the doctrine itself should not apply.
Contra proferentem serves no useful purpose where there is no culpable
party to blame for the ambiguous language in a contract or no innocent
party to protect from the contract. Consequently, courts over the years
have recognized several limitations on the applicability of the contra
proferentem doctrine. 45
Most of the historical limitations on the contra proferentem doctrine
are intuitive. First, the contra proferentem doctrine is a rule of last resort.46
44. E.g., Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983);
see Hall v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 317 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the contra proferentem rule does not require a “pro-insured decision in every
case”); see also Paul Sullivan & Jeffrey Gordon, Contra Proferentem Doesn’t
Always Mean “Against the Insurer”, JDSUPRA (July 21, 2016), https://www.jd
supra.com/legalnews/contra-proferentem-doesn-t-always-mean-89102/ [https://
perma.cc/YQP7-ZUGT] (“Contrary to what sometimes appears to be common
understanding, the English translation of the Latin phrase contra proferentem is
not ‘the insurance company loses.’”). Many commentators have complained that
courts, particularly in insurance cases, have improperly applied the contra
proferentem rule beyond its historical limitations. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note
42, at 1124 (“Although the ambiguity rule is a secondary rule of construction and
should therefore be a last resort, for decades, Ohio courts have invariably applied
the doctrine as the primary rule of construction.”).
45. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 58 (2015) (“[T]he reach of
the canon construing contract language against the drafter must have limits, no
matter who the drafter was.”); see also John R. Riddlefe, “If It’s a Tie, You Lose”
— The Limits of the Contra Proferentem Doctrine in Construing Insurance Policies,
27th Annual N.E. Surety & Fidelity Claims Conf., Sept. 22, 2016, at 4–7.
46. E.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2019); Record
Club of Am., Inc. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 890 F.2d 1264, 1271 (2d Cir.
1989); Quad Constr., Inc. v. Wm. A. Smith Contracting Co., 534 F.2d 1391, 1394
(10th Cir. 1976); Hurd v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955),
aff’d, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956); Prestige Oilfield Servs., LLC v. Devon Energy
Prod. Co., No. 18-1173, 2019 WL 764669, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 21, 2019);
Wilmington Firefighters Ass’n, Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington, No. 19035,
2002 WL 418032, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2002); Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773
N.W.2d 564, 570 (Mich. 2009); Fernandez v. Price, 880 N.Y.S.2d 169, 173 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Telecell Cellular, Inc.,
955 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Tex. App. 1997); see Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default
Rules in Insurance Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305, 326–27 (2013) (“Although
some courts seem unclear on the concept, contra proferentem is meant to be a rule
of last resort . . . .”); Michele L. Fenice & Adam P. Friedman, The Rule of Contra
Proferentem and Why It Should Not Apply to the Interpretation of Fidelity Bonds,

356

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IX

It applies only where a contract is ambiguous and a court has no other
means available to construe the ambiguous language. 47 Effectively, the
contra proferentem doctrine is contract law’s equivalent of baseball’s rule
that a tie goes to the runner. As a rule of last resort, the contra proferentem
doctrine is relevant only in the event of a tie—i.e., the parties have
respectively advanced two or more equally reasonable, but mutually
inconsistent, interpretations of their contract. 48 Therefore:
21 FIDELITY L.J. 233, 242 (2015) (noting that the modern trend is that “automatic
application of the rule of contra proferentem is discouraged, and courts resort to
the rule only as a last resort”); Miller, supra note 42, at 1851 (“Under contract
law, contra proferentem was strictly a device of last resort.”).
47. E.g., Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 608, 616 (2d
Cir. 2001); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bowie, 574 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. 1978); see
Gardiner, Kamya & Assocs., P.C. v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (noting that the contra proferentem rule is “applied only when other
approaches to contract interpretation have failed”); see also BRUNER &
O’CONNOR, supra note 43, at § 3:59 (“The contra proferentem rule . . . [is] a rule
of last resort, when all other means of resolving a latent ambiguity prove
unsuccessful. The rule means that, with no other way to resolve the latent
ambiguity, the interpretations of the parties each remain reasonable, the courts as
a last resort will construe the ambiguity against the drafter of the [contract]
specifications and permit the interpretation of the non-drafter to prevail.”);
Boardman, supra note 46, at 327 (“Only after all other interpretive methods have
been exhausted—and the court is still left with language that either has no clear
meaning or two plausible meanings—is contra proferentem to apply.”); Duncan,
supra note 42, at 1123 (noting that the contra proferentem rule “has been
classified as a secondary rule to be utilized only if the meaning of the contract
remains unclear after the primary rules have been applied and all other secondary
rules have failed”).
48. E.g., Residential Mktg. Grp. v. Granite Inv. Grp., 933 F.2d 546, 549 (7th
Cir. 1991); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 915 (S.D.
Ind. 1994), aff’d, 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996); Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC,
84 A.3d 828, 837 (Conn. 2014); see Durrett v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. A-14-CA-167-SS, 2015 WL 1564783, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015) (noting
that the contra proferentem rule “is essentially a tie-breaking device used to
prevent arbitrary decisions when all other methods of interpretation and
construction prove unsatisfactory”); see also Leib & Thel, supra note 41, at 786
(noting that “courts tend to treat the rule as ‘tiebreaker’ or a ‘rule of last resort,’
as it has often been characterized”).
Because the contra proferentem doctrine is a rule of last resort that applies only
as a tiebreaker, Professor Corbin argued that contra proferentem was not a rule of
construction at all, but rather a “rule of policy, generally favoring the underdog.”
5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., 1998); see Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 456
(Mich. 2003) (“In our judgment, the rule of contra proferentem is not a rule of
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• The doctrine does not apply where “the intent of the parties is
clear and a resort to the rule will defeat that intent.” 49
• The doctrine does not apply where the parties’ contract is
unambiguous and only one interpretation of the disputed contract
language is reasonable.50
• The doctrine does not apply where a court or fact finder may
determine the intent of the parties through other means, such as
extrinsic evidence or other applicable rules of contract
construction. 51
Second, the contra proferentem doctrine applies only against a party who
is properly responsible for the ambiguous language. At its essence, the
contra proferentem doctrine holds that if a clause in a contract is
construction; rather . . . it is a rule of legal effect. While rules of construction are
designed to help determine the parties’ intent, the rule of contra proferentem is
designed to resolve a dispute where the parties’ intent cannot be determined.”);
see also Boardman, supra note 46, at 325 (“If the goal of modern interpretation is
to determine the meaning the parties attached to the words at the time of
contracting, counting the words themselves as primary but not exclusive evidence,
contra proferentem is not a rule of interpretation.”).
49. Clardy Mfg. Co. v. Marine Midland Bus. Loans Inc., 88 F.3d 347, 355
(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Modular Tech. Corp. v. City of Lubbock, 529 S.W.2d
273, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
50. See Savedoff v. Access Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 767 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting that while the parties to a contract may interpret it differently, “an
ambiguity may only be found (and, thus, the contra proferentem rule may only be
applied) if those different interpretations are both reasonable ones”).
51. E.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 497, 505 (8th
Cir. 2011); Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 189 F.3d
208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447,
456 (Mich. 2003); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Esswein, 43 S.W.3d 833, 842
(Mo. Ct. App. 2000); see Micro Focus (U.S.), Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No.
PX-16-0971, 2019 WL 557080, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 2019) (“To allow
otherwise would mean that claims of contractual ambiguity must be taken away
from the jury once the Court ascertains a reasonable meaning in favor of the nondrafter, competing facts be damned. The law does not support reading the [contra
proferentem] doctrine to supplant the function of the jury.”); see also Miller,
supra note 42, at 1851 (noting that historically the contra proferentem rule “was
not to be employed until the court had first examined all the contemporaneous
circumstances and communications, any past agreements between the two parties,
the local, general, technical, and trade usages of the disputed terms, and finally
the customs of the relevant community”).
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ambiguous, a court may construe the clause against the party who caused
the ambiguity in the first place—i.e., the party who drafted the ambiguous
clause. 52 In that sense, the doctrine presumes that one of the parties is more
responsible or culpable than the other for the ambiguous language. 53
Historically, a court may not construe ambiguous language against a party
who was not solely, or at least predominantly, responsible for drafting the
ambiguous language. 54 Therefore:
• The doctrine does not apply against one party where the other
party drafted the ambiguous language; and specifically, the rule
does not apply against an insurer where the insured drafted the
ambiguous language. 55
• The doctrine does not apply where both parties participated
equally in drafting the ambiguous contract language.56
52. See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
53. E.g., Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 366 (3d Cir.
2014); Northwest Adm’rs, Inc. v. Sacramento Stucco, 86 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
54. E.g., Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
55. E.g., BB Syndication Servs., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 780 F.3d
825, 830 n.4 (7th Cir. 2015); Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 100 F.
App’x 387, 391 (6th Cir. 2004); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1071 (3d Cir. 1980); Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 718 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1030, 1037–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Metpath,
Inc. v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 449 N.Y.S.2d 986, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
see Sullivan & Gordon, supra note 44 (“Analytically, it stands to reason that when
the insured drafts the policy, the doctrine of contra proferentem would apply
against the insured, as the drafter of the instrument, for the same reasons it has
been often applied against the insurer. The drafting party chooses the language,
can take steps to protect its interests and should bear the consequences of any
drafting errors.”). But see James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject
to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995,
1014 (1992) (noting that some courts have applied the contra proferentem rule
against an insurer “even though the portion of the insurance contract to be
construed was drafted by the insured”) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
794 F.2d 710, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
56. E.g., Tranzact Techs., Ltd. v. Evergreen Partners, Ltd., 366 F.3d 542, 545
n.1 (7th Cir. 2004); Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954,
960 (8th Cir. 2012); Calcasieu-Marine Nat’l Bank v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 533
F.2d 290, 296 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Info. Leasing
Corp. v. McGladrey & Pullen, L.L.P., No. 03-5111JNEJGL, 2005 WL 1706113,
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• The doctrine does not apply to benefit a stranger to the contract,
such as a reinsurer complaining about the scope of allegedly
ambiguous coverage in the primary insurance policy. 57
Third, at least as a general rule, the contra proferentem doctrine applies
only in favor of an innocent party who had little or no ability to negotiate
any of the terms of the contract. 58 Especially in the insurance context, most
courts have recognized a sophisticated party exception to the contra
proferentem doctrine. 59 A sophisticated party does not need the benefit of
at *3 (D. Minn. July 21, 2005); Kozura v. Tulpehocken Area Sch. Dist., 791 A.2d
1169, 1175 n.8 (Pa. 2002); Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds, London, No. 2018AP1926, 2019 WL 6121350, at *6 n.6
(Wis. Ct. App. 2019).
57. E.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 331, 333
(7th Cir. 2000); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 408 P.2d 596, 598
(Kan. 1965); Econ. Premier Assur. Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d
749, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Am. Cas. Co., 441 P.2d
177, 180 (Mont. 1968).
58. E.g., Shaw Hofstra & Assocs. v. Ladco Dev., Inc., 673 F.3d 819, 828 (8th
Cir. 2012); see Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 78 (N.J. 2007) (noting that the
contra proferentem doctrine “is only available in situations where the parties have
unequal bargaining power”); see also Leib & Thel, supra note 41, at 780 (noting
that the contra proferentem doctrine “has especial importance in the take-it-orleave-it context of standard form contracting”).
59. E.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 497, 505 (8th
Cir. 2011); Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Travelers Cos., 585 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th
Cir. 2009); Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 858–59 (7th
Cir. 2002); Prof’l Consultants Ins. Co. v. Emp’rs Reinsurance Co., No. 1:03-CV216, 2006 WL 751244, at *3 n.5 (D. Vt. Mar. 8, 2006); In re Enron Corp. Sec.
Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 541, 578 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Rouse Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 991
F. Supp. 460, 466 (D. Md. 1998); Indus. Risk Insurers v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
Inc., 666 F. Supp. 874, 881 (E.D. La. 1987); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Grand
Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1987);
Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d 263, 268–69
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 843 A.2d
1094, 1103–04 (N.J. 2004); Cummins, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 867
N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 771 N.W.2d 611, 616–17 (S.D. 2009).
Several courts have applied a sophisticated party exception to the contra
proferentem doctrine even outside of the insurance context. See, e.g., FabArc
Steel Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr. Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 359 (Ala.
2005); Kinney v. Capitol-Strauss, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 1973);
Norcomo Corp. v. Franchi Constr. Co., 587 S.W.2d 311, 317 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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an artificial rule of contract construction: It is perfectly capable of
protecting itself against ambiguous contract language. 60 This is true even
if the sophisticated party did not draft the ambiguous language. 61 And in
any event, a court or fact finder usually has sufficient extrinsic evidence
to determine the meaning of any ambiguous language in a contract that is
Not all courts, however, have embraced the sophisticated party exception to the
contra proferentem doctrine. Some courts have rejected the sophisticated party
exception. See, e.g., Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d
508, 521 (3d Cir. 1997); Central Tel. Co. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., No. 3:09cv720,
2011 WL 6205975, at *11 n.12 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2011).
60. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 810–
11 (Tex. 2012); see Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir.
1983) (“[I]n cases involving bargained-for contracts, negotiated by sophisticated
parties, the underlying adhesion contract rationale for the doctrine is inapposite.”);
Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976)
(“We do not feel compelled to apply, or, indeed, justified in applying the general
rule that an insurance policy is construed against the insurer in the commercial
insurance field when the insured is not an innocent but a corporation of immense
size, carrying insurance with annual premiums in six figures, managed by
sophisticated business men, and represented by counsel on the same professional
level as the counsel for insurers. . . . There is no purpose in following a legal
platitude that has no realistic application to a contract confected by a large
corporation and a large insurance company each advised by competent counsel
and informed experts.”); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
482 F.3d 976, 977 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The argument for contra proferentem is pretty
feeble when the policyholder is a sophisticated commercial enterprise rather than
an individual consumer.”); Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Falvey Cargo
Underwriting, Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 2d 814, 823 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that the
contra proferentem doctrine does not apply to sophisticated insureds because
“they are able to interpret the policy on their own, lessening the likelihood that
the insurer will take advantage of them”); Pacifico, 920 A.2d at 78 (“If both
parties are equally ‘worldly-wise’ and sophisticated, contra proferentem is
inappropriate.”); see also Barry R. Ostrager & David W. Ichel, The Role of
Bargaining Power Evidence in the Construction of the Business Insurance Policy:
An Update, 18 FORUM 577, 583 (1983) (“[I]n cases involving bargained-for
contracts, negotiated by sophisticated parties, the underlying adhesion contract
rationale for the doctrine is inapposite.”).
61. See Fenice & Friedman, supra note 46, at 247 (“If the reason courts
interpret insurance policies against the insurer is because most policies are
considered to be contracts of adhesion, then where an insured is a large,
sophisticated entity, the policy by rule cannot be an adhesion contract and the rule
of contra proferentem should not apply. . . . The question should not be whether
the insured actually participated in the process of drafting or negotiating the terms
of the policy; it should be whether the insured had the ability to do so.”).
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the product of negotiations between parties of relatively equivalent
bargaining strength. 62
At the risk of stating a tautology, the necessary consequence of these
historical limitations is that the contra proferentem doctrine is a rule of
limited application: In those rare instances when a court has no extrinsic
evidence or other available tools to divine the meaning of ambiguous
contract language, the court may construe the language against the party,
if any, who actually drafted the language and was responsible for creating
the ambiguity in the first place.63 The contra proferentem doctrine, at least
based on its historical limitations, does not permit a court to redraft an
otherwise unambiguous contract for the purpose of producing an outcome
that the court may deem to be more equitable to one of the parties.64
III. MISUSE OF THE “AGAINST THE LESSEE” RULE OF CONSTRUCTION:
THE EXAMPLE OF FIRST MARKETABLE PRODUCT CASE LAW
The “against the lessee” rule of construction masquerades as an oil and
gas version of the contra proferentem rule. 65 Just as the contra
proferentem rule assumes that an insurer is the party responsible for any
ambiguous language in an insurance policy, the “against the lessee” rule
assumes that a lessee is the party responsible for any ambiguous language
in an oil and gas lease. 66 Like the contra proferentem rule, the “against the
lessee” rule purports to discourage poor draftsmanship. 67 And like the
62. E.g., Emp’rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757,
767 (10th Cir. 2004); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. General Reinsurance Corp.,
949 F.2d 569, 573–74 (2d Cir. 1991); Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, No. 2018AP1926, 2019 WL 6121350,
at *6 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 2019); see BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 43, at §
3:59 (“The ‘contra proferentem’ rule is used less frequently in private agreements
negotiated between parties in roughly equal bargaining positions. This is because
there usually is sufficient extrinsic evidence available to reach a resolution as to
what the parties intended.”).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 46–63.
64. See Fenice & Friedman, supra note 46, at 235.
65. See, e.g., Lomree, Inc. v. Pan Gas Storage, LLC, No. 10-14425, 2011 WL
3498131, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2011) (noting that the “against the lessee”
rule essentially re-states the contra proferentem rule by declaring that courts
should construe oil and gas leases in favor of the lessor), rev’d on other grounds,
No. 11-2132, 2012 WL 3871882 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2012).
66. See supra text accompanying note 32.
67. See, e.g., Rook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc., 679 P.2d 158, 164
(Kan. 1984) (“[W]here the lessee desires it may protect itself by the manner in
which the lease is drawn.”); cf. supra text accompanying note 41.
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contra proferentem rule, the “against the lessee” rule purports to protect
lessors and other royalty owners against overreaching form leases that may
appear to operate as contracts of adhesion. 68
If, in fact, the “against the lessee” rule of construction is simply an oil
and gas version of the contra proferentem doctrine, then the same
principles that limit the reach of the contra proferentem doctrine should
apply equally to the “against the lessee” rule. Many courts, however, have
seemingly applied the “against the lessee” rule far more broadly than the
contra proferentem doctrine. 69 Often they have done so innocently and in
a way that has not materially changed the outcome of a dispute: For
example, courts in many cases have cited the “against the lessee” rule to
bolster a pro-lessor interpretation of leases that they have already found to
be unambiguous.70 If the leases in those cases were indeed unambiguous,
then those courts likely reached the correct result even though the contra
68. See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300 (9th
Cir. 1938) (“[P]rotection of the interests of the lessor is considered of paramount
importance.”); see also Williston H. Symonds, Note, The Michaelangelo of the
Oklahoma Oil & Gas Industry: The Cessation of Production Clause, Spontaneous
Lease Terminations, and Cyclical or Marginal Production Problems, 17 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 413, 413 (1992) (noting that the “against the lessee” rule satisfies
“a number of goals, one of which was to improve the balance between the
bargaining position of the lessor against the stronger bargaining position of the
lessee”); cf. supra text accompanying note 43.
In cases where the lessor argues that an oil and gas lease terminated after the lessee
failed to develop the lease or secure any production from the lease in paying
quantities, some courts have suggested that the “against the lessee” rule serves the
purpose of promoting oil and gas development. E.g., Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d
294, 299 (N.M. 1970).
69. See infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text.
70. E.g., Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Ark. 1988);
Greer, 479 P.2d at 298; see Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503, 508–09
(Mont. 1991) (“Further support of this holding is found in the general rule that oil
and gas leases are to be construed liberally in favor of the lessor and against the
lessee.”); see also Pierce, supra note 35, at 919 (noting that courts often tend to
use the “against the lessee” rule when it supports “the desired outcome even
though there may be no need to resolve an ambiguity, or even a need to interpret
the express terms of the contract”).
Some courts have cited the “against the lessee” rule without making any effort to
apply it or discuss it at all. E.g., Geysers Dev. P’ship v. Geysers Power Co., 805
F. App’x 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2020); Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 611,
614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 225 (Colo. App. 1992);
State ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office v. Couch, 298 P.2d 452, 453 (Okla.
1956); Clark v. Perez, 679 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. App. 1984).

2021]

CONTRA PROFERENTEM IN THE OIL PATCH?

363

proferentem doctrine is a rule of last resort and does not normally apply to
an unambiguous contract. 71
But in other cases, courts have applied the “against the lessee” rule in
a way that not only has materially altered the outcome of oil and gas
disputes, but is also potentially harmful rather than innocent. The opinions
in those cases follow a familiar pattern: Without applying any other rules
of lease or contract construction, those courts have declared that lease
language is “ambiguous” and then invoked the “against the lessee” rule of
construction to reach a result that favors the lessor. 72 They often have done
so even when the lease language either unambiguously favors the lessee
or is subject to a reasonable interpretation that a jury or other factfinder
could reach in favor of the lessee after considering extrinsic evidence. 73
A notable example is the case law that developed the first marketable
product doctrine. Many oil and gas leases require that lessees pay royalties
on the basis of the market value of their oil and gas production “at the
well” or “at the wellhead.” 74 Until the first marketable product doctrine
came into prominence, courts routinely ruled that the term “at the well”
was unambiguous and designated the location at which lessees were to
calculate the market value of their production for royalty purposes;
consequently, those courts concluded that lessees could use a “workback”
methodology to calculate their royalty payments. 75 Under a workback
methodology, lessees may calculate the market value of their lessors’
royalty share of the oil or gas production “at the well” by subtracting the
lessors’ share of any post-production expenses from the lessors’ share of

71. See supra text accompanying notes 46–62.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 80–113.
73. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
74. See Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable
Product Doctrine: Just What is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 15–16 (2005).
75. See Potts v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 760 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2014);
Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir.
1984); Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 69 F.3d 283, 285 (8th Cir. 1995);
Hemler v. Union Producing Co., 40 F. Supp. 824, 832 (W.D. La. 1941), rev’d on
other grounds, 134 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1943); Cumberland Pipe Line Co. v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Ky. St. Tax Comm’n, 15 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Ky. 1929); Atl.
Richfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Wall v.
United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561, 564 (La. 1934); Merritt v. Sw. Elec.
Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 214 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Mont. Power Co. v.
Kravik, 586 P.2d 298, 303 (Mont. 1978); Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939
S.W.2d 118, 130 (Tex. 1996) (Owen, J., concurring); Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Cernosek, 188 S.W.3d 354, 361 (Tex. App. 2006).
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the price that the lessees received on selling the oil or gas at a downstream
sales location. 76
By contrast, courts that have adopted the first marketable product
doctrine have ruled that lessees generally may not use a workback
methodology to calculate their royalty payments. 77 According to courts
that have adopted the first marketable product doctrine, lessees must bear
all of the costs necessary to achieve a marketable product, including
almost all post-production costs. 78 Those courts have concluded that even
under a royalty clause requiring lessees to pay royalties based on the
market value of its production “at the well,” lessees must normally
calculate their royalty payments on the basis of the price or value of their
production at the downstream location where they first acquire a
76. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 21; see also Potts, 760 F.3d at
472 (noting that a workback methodology is “nothing more than a method of
determining market value at the well in the absence of comparable sales data at or
near the wellhead”); Salzman & Friess, supra note 10, at 7-9 (“[T]he common
practice of lessees for determining the value upon which to pay royalties is to take
the value produced by the downstream sale of the production and subtract the
postproduction expenses incurred downstream of the well to get the production to
the point of sale. This process is often referred to as a netback or workback method
of calculating royalties.”); see also Atl. Richfield Co., 262 Cal. Rptr. at 688 (“[I]t
is commonly understood that ‘market price at the well’ is often determined by
working back from the price at the point of sale, deducting the cost of processing
and transportation to the wellhead, to determine ‘market value at the
wellhead[.]’”); Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573
S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. 2019) (“A royalty on production valued at the well does
not include the value added by post-production costs. When a royalty payment is
based on a downstream sales price, the value added by post-production costs must
be subtracted from the sales price or otherwise accounted for in order to
approximate the ‘at the well’ value of the products.” (citations omitted)); Heritage
Res., Inc., 939 S.W.2d at 130 (Owen, J., concurring) (“Evidence of market value
. . . can be proven by the so-called net-back approach, which determines the
prevailing market price at a given point and backs out the necessary, reasonable
costs between that point and the wellhead.”).
77. See Byron C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil & Gas Royalty Accounting:
Drafting a Royalty Clause that Actually Says What the Parties Intend It to Mean,
69 BAYLOR L. REV. 517, 535–36 (2017).
78. E.g., Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 901 (Colo. 2001);
Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Gilmore v. Superior Oil
Co., 388 P.2d 602, 605 (Kan. 1964); Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d
788, 797 (Kan. 1995); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203,
1208 (Okla. 1998); Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d
22, 29 (W. Va. 2006); Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W.
Va. 2001).
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marketable product, not on the basis of the price or value that they may
calculate for their production at the wellhead under a workback
methodology. 79
Two of the most prominent cases on the first marketable product
doctrine are the Colorado Supreme Court opinion in Rogers v. Westerman
Farm Co.80 and the West Virginia Supreme Court opinion in Estate of
Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C. 81
A. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Rogers relied heavily on the “against
the lessee” rule of construction to support its decision to adopt the first
marketable product doctrine. The plaintiffs in Rogers were royalty owners
under oil and gas leases providing that their lessees would pay royalties on
the basis of the market value or market price of their production “at the
well.” 82 The defendant lessees argued that the term “at the well” permitted
them to calculate their royalty payments by using a workback
methodology. 83 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the term “at the
well” was insufficient in itself to “set forth the proper allocation between
the parties of the costs of gathering, compressing, and dehydrating the
gas.” 84
In reaching its conclusion that the defendant lessees could not use a
workback methodology to calculate their royalty payments, the court in
Rogers emphasized that it was “mindful of the generally accepted rule that
oil and gas leases are strictly construed against the lessee in favor of the
lessor.” 85 The court cursorily observed that “lessors are not usually
familiar with the law related to oil and gas leases, while lessees, through
experience drafting and litigating leases, generally are.” 86 But tellingly,
79. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 10, at 21 (discussing the first
marketable product case law).
80. 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
81. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
82. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 891.
83. Id. at 894.
84. Id. at 887.
85. Id. at 901; see Savage v. Williams Prod. RMT Co., 140 P.3d 67, 69 (Colo.
App. 2005) (citing Rogers and noting that the “generally accepted rule is that oil
and gas leases are strictly construed against the lessee and in favor of the lessor”).
86. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 902; see David E. Pierce, Royalty Jurisprudence: A
Tale of Two States, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 347, 363 (2010) (noting that the court in
Rogers cited a presumed lack of lessor sophistication “as the predicate for
unsheathing contract law’s bluntest of interpretive instruments — the contra
proferentem rule of construction”).
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the supreme court did not discuss the experience, knowledge, or
sophistication of any of the actual plaintiffs in Rogers. Nor did it address
whether any of those plaintiffs had participated in drafting or negotiating
any of the royalty clauses at issue in Rogers.
Nor did the court in Rogers find that the term “at the well” was
ambiguous. Despite acknowledging that a majority of courts had
concluded that the term “at the well” unambiguously defined the location
at which lessees could calculate the market value of their oil and gas
production for royalty purposes, the court in Rogers reasoned that the term
“at the well” was “silent with respect to allocation of costs.”87 The supreme
court did not hold that the term “at the well” was reasonably susceptible
to two different interpretations. Instead, the court in Rogers held that the
term “at the well” had no meaning at all, and it effectively rewrote the
parties’ leases to delete the term “at the well” from the leases’ royalty
clauses. 88
Having determined that the term “at the well” was silent with respect
to the allocation of costs, the court in Rogers ruled that under a royalty
clause requiring that lessees pay royalties on the market value of their
production “at the well,” lessees must calculate their royalty payments on
the basis of the value of their production at the location where they first
acquire a marketable product. 89 The court stated:
[W]e have concluded that the “at the well” lease language in this
case is silent as to allocation of all costs . . . . Under these
circumstances, the logic of the first-marketable product rule
requires that the allocation of all costs be determined based on
when the gas is marketable.
....
Once gas is deemed marketable based on a factual determination,
the allocation of all costs can properly be determined. Absent
express lease provisions addressing allocation of costs, the
87. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 902. The supreme court conceded that it was “in the
minority” in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 901.
88. Id. at 902; see David E. Pierce, The Royalty Value Theorem and the Legal
Calculus of Post-Extraction Costs, 23 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. § 6.01, at 152
(2003) (“In Rogers the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the phrase ‘at the
well’ out of existence.”); cf. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and
Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 225 (1995) (criticizing an application of the contra
proferentem doctrine in which judges “hold unambiguous terms to be ambiguous
to avoid giving effect to provisions they perceive to be harsh”).
89. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 906.
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lessee’s duty to market requires that the lessee bear the expenses
incurred in obtaining a marketable product. Thus, the expense of
getting the product to a marketable condition and location are
borne by the lessee. 90
In citing the “against the lessee” rule of construction to support its
conclusion, the court in Rogers emphasized that “the bargaining power
between a lessor and lessee is similar to that historically found between an
insurance company and its customers.”91 That, however, is at best
misleading, if not flatly untrue. There often are no negotiations at all in an
insurance transaction: insurance companies typically offer their policies
on a “take it or leave it” basis. Oil and gas leases, by comparison, are not
adhesion contracts. 92 They commonly are the product of active and
extensive negotiations, especially on the terms of the royalty clause.93
90. Id. The court’s argument that the term “at the well” is silent with respect
to “allocation of costs” erects a strawman. The term “at the well” does not purport
to serve the purpose of “allocating” costs between the lessee and lessor; rather,
the term “at the well” defines the location or point at which the lessee should
calculate the market value or price of its production for royalty purposes. See Scott
Lansdown, The Marketable Condition Rule, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 667, 673 (2003)
(noting that “the issue may best be framed not as whether post-production costs
are deductible, but rather the point at which royalty is to be calculated”); cf.
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 74, at 36 (“[T]he workback method is simply an
appraisal technique. It is not a cost-shifting rule, and it does not apply when the
lessee does not need to estimate the value of its production at the wellhead by
reference to its value at a downstream location.”). On its face, a royalty clause
stating that a lessor’s royalty is 25% of the market value of the lessee’s oil
production “at the well” is reasonably susceptible only to one interpretation—that
the lessee should calculate its royalty payments on the basis of 25% of the market
value of its oil production at the wellhead, not at a downstream sales location. See
Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 74, at 87–88.
91. Rogers, 29 P.3d at 902.
92. See Pierce, supra note 86, at 363 n.76; see also Pierce, supra note 35, at
916 (“[L]essees rarely present their offers to lease on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
93. See O’Neill & Keeling, supra note 5, § 6.02[1][a], at 6-4; see also Jeff
King, Lessor vs. Lessee and the Implied Covenant to Market, 63 TEX. BAR J. 854,
854 (2000) (“Oil and gas leases are negotiated contracts. . . . As to the royalty
amount, the parties to the lease are free to decide and define the type, basis, or
standard for the royalties to be paid.”); Pierce, supra note 17, at 418 n.182
(“[M]any oil and gas leases are in fact negotiated and [contain] significant
concessions made by the lessee to obtain the lessor’s assent.”); Pierce, supra note
35, at 917 (noting that oil and gas leases often are “the product of active
negotiation between the lessor (or the lessor’s legal counsel or other
representative) and the lessee”); Shannon H. Ratliff & S. Jack Balagia, Jr., Oil
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While lease negotiations will often begin with a printed form lease that the
lessee presents to the lessor, a lessor enjoys much greater bargaining
power against a lessee than an insured enjoys against an insurer. 94
But even if it were true that the bargaining power between a lessor and
lessee is akin to the bargaining power between an insured and insurer, the
supreme court in Rogers should have applied the “against the lessee” rule
of construction consistently with the way that courts apply the contra
proferentem doctrine to an insurance policy. The court in Rogers did not
do so. It applied the “against the lessee” rule as a rule of first resort, not a
rule of last resort. And instead of using the rule to resolve an ambiguity,
the court in Rogers, by its own admission, invoked the rule to create an
ambiguity—by interpreting the term “at the well” to mean something
entirely different from what most other courts had previously interpreted
it to mean.
B. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.
The “against the lessee” rule of construction served an equally
prominent role in Estate of Tawney. The plaintiffs in Estate of Tawney
filed a class action alleging that their lessee, Columbia Natural Resources,
L.L.C., had not paid adequate royalties to its royalty owners. 95 Many of
the class members were lessors under leases containing “language
indicating that the royalty payment is to be calculated ‘at the well.’” 96
Columbia filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the term “at
the well” is unambiguous and permitted it to use a workback methodology
to calculate its royalty payments. 97 The trial court denied Columbia’s
and Gas Royalty Class Action Litigation: Pushing the Limits of Rule 23 and
Comparable State Class Action Rules, 46 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §
21.01[2][b], at 21-9 (2000) (noting that “oil and gas leases are frequently and
fiercely negotiated”).
94. See Pierce, supra note 86, at 363 n.76 (“The situation of the parties to an
oil and gas lease is fundamentally different from that of an insured under an
insurance policy. In an oil and gas lease, only one party controls whether her
property will be leased, and on what terms: the lessor. Once a lessor is aware she
does not have to lease her property to anyone, she has the power to hold out for
the best deal she can negotiate under the circumstances — or elect not to lease.
The oil and gas lease is not an adhesion contract. Although landowners may be
presented with a developer’s printed form, in most cases the resulting lease will
be the product of negotiation between the parties.”).
95. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 25 (W.
Va. 2006).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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motion and certified the summary judgment issues to the West Virginia
Supreme Court. 98 The supreme court stated: “[T]he present dispute boils
down to whether the “at the wellhead”-type language at issue is sufficient
to alter our generally recognized rule that the lessee must bear all costs of
marketing and transporting the product to the point of sale. We conclude
that it is not.” 99
Unlike the court in Rogers, the court in Estate of Tawney explicitly
ruled that the term “at the well” is ambiguous. 100 Without citing or
mentioning any extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the term, the
supreme court in Estate of Tawney asserted:
[T]he language lacks definiteness. In other words, it is imprecise.
While the language arguably indicates that the royalty is to be
calculated at the well or the gas is to be valued at the well, the
language does not indicate how or by what method the royalty is
to be calculated or the gas is to be valued. For example, notably
absent are any specific provisions pertaining to the marketing,
transportation, or processing of the gas. In addition, in light of our
traditional rule that lessors are to receive a royalty of the sale price
of gas, the general language at issue simply is inadequate to
indicate an intent by the parties to agree to a contrary rule—that
the lessors are not to receive 1/8 of the sale price but rather 1/8 of
the sale price less a proportionate share of deductions for
transporting and processing the gas. 101
Thus, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that it was unable to
conclude that the term “at the well” was “originally intended by the parties,
at the time of execution, to allocate post-production costs between the
lessor and the lessee.” 102
Having found that the “at the well” language in the parties’ leases was
ambiguous, the court in Estate of Tawney emphasized that the “against the
lessee” rule required that it “construe the language against the lessee.”103
98. Id.
99. Id. at 28. The supreme court in Estate of Tawney did not write in a total
vacuum. In a 2001 opinion, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that as a
general rule, a lessee “must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing,
marketing and transporting [its production] to the point of sale.” Wellman v.
Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001).
100. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 28.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 29.
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The lessee, Columbia, raised two objections to the “against the lessee”
rule:
• First, Columbia argued that the “against the lessee” rule was
inapplicable because many of the class members were either
sophisticated royalty owners or had consulted with oil and gas
counsel before signing their leases. 104 The supreme court declined
to recognize any sophisticated lessor exception to the “against the
lessee” rule, 105 asserting that the lessee bears the responsibility of
drafting “specific language” which informs its lessors—whether
sophisticated or not—“exactly how their royalties were to be
calculated and what deductions were to be taken from the royalty
amounts for post-production expenses.” 106
• Second, Columbia argued that the “against the lessee” rule was
inapplicable because a jury or other fact finder, and not a court as
a matter of law, should determine the meaning of any ambiguous
language in an oil and gas lease.107 But even though the Estate of
Tawney case came to the supreme court as an interlocutory appeal
from a class action in which the parties presumably had not yet
completed all of their discovery efforts, the supreme court ruled
that the record contained no conflicting extrinsic evidence that
would require a jury to determine the meaning of the “at the well”
language in the parties’ leases. 108
Despite suggesting that conflicting extrinsic evidence might in some cases
raise a jury issue about the meaning of the term “at the well,” the court in
Estate of Tawney reasoned—seemingly as a matter of law—that the term
“at the well” is insufficient in itself to permit a lessee to use a workback
methodology to calculate its royalty payments:
[T]his Court now holds that language in an oil and gas lease that
is intended to allocate between the lessor and lessee the costs of
marketing the product and transporting it to the point of sale must
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 29–30.
107. Id. at 30.
108. Id. at 30 & n.5; see Pierce, supra note 86, at 369 n.113 (noting that the
court in Estate of Tawney apparently “concluded, based upon a certified question
submitted out of a summary judgment proceeding involving 8,000 plaintiffs, that
whatever extrinsic evidence that might have existed regarding the intent of these
thousands of parties, the evidence would not have, in any event, been in conflict”).
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expressly provide that the lessor must bear some part of the costs
incurred between the wellhead and the point of sale, identify with
particularity the specific deductions the lessee intends to take from
the lessor’s royalty (usually 1/8), and indicate the method of
calculating the amount to be deducted from the royalty for such
post-production costs.109
Absent any such specific language, the court concluded that even under a
lease requiring that a lessee pay royalties based on the market value of its
oil or gas production “at the well,” the lessee must calculate its royalty
payments on the basis of the price that it receives for its production at the
downstream “point of sale.”110
Unlike Rogers, the supreme court in Estate of Tawney did not apply
the “against the lessee” rule as a doctrine of first resort: it at least found
that the language which it construed against the lessee was ambiguous. But
neither did the court in Estate of Tawney apply the “against the lessee” rule
as a doctrine of last resort. Even putting aside whether the parties, with
complete discovery, could have developed extrinsic evidence on the
meaning of the term “at the well,”111 the West Virginia Supreme Court
rejected case law from other states holding that the term “at the well” is
unambiguous and means exactly what it says. 112 Instead, the court in
Estate of Tawney found an ambiguity where historically there was no
ambiguity at all—presumably in the guise of protecting lessors, at least
109. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 30. The court in Estate of Tawney
imprecisely argued that a workback methodology permits a lessee to “deduct”
post-production expenses from its royalties. In a later opinion, the supreme court
acknowledged that the workback methodology “does not ‘charge’ the lessor with
any expenses at all, but instead is simply a method of determining what the
wellhead value of the gas would have been if there had been a market for the gas
at the wellhead.” Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co., 800 S.E.2d 850, 856 n.8 (W. Va.
2017) (quoting Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs When
Calculating Royalty: What Does the Lease Provide?, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 29
(2008)); see Potts v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 760 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2014);
Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 130 (Tex. 1996) (Owen, J.,
concurring); see also Lansdown, supra note 90, at 671 (“[T]he issue may best be
framed not as whether post-production costs are deductible, but rather the point at
which royalty is to be calculated.”).
110. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 30.
111. See supra text accompanying note 51.
112. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 27. The court acknowledged that the
Colorado Supreme Court in Rogers “recognized that it may be in the minority of
states on this issue.” Id. (citing Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 897
(Colo. 2001)).
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some of whom were sophisticated royalty owners perfectly capable of
protecting themselves. 113
Significantly, the current status of the first marketable product
doctrine in West Virginia is unclear. In Leggett v. EQT Production Co.,114
the West Virginia Supreme Court pointedly criticized its prior opinion in
Estate of Tawney, suggesting that its reasoning in that case stood on “faulty
legs.”115 The supreme court in Leggett, however, declined to overrule
Estate of Tawney, instead stating: “[H]owever under-developed or
inadequately reasoned this Court observes Wellman and Tawney to be, the
issue presently before the Court simply does not permit intrusion into these
issues. We therefore leave for another day the continued vitality and scope
of Wellman and Tawney.” 116

113. Id. at 28; see Pierce, supra note 86, at 369 (“The court apparently believed
West Virginia lessors needed protection against lessee adjustments to the
proceeds received when calculating royalty. To provide that protection and to
provide the lessor with a larger piece of the gas-production pie, it resorted to the
powerful one-two punch of an ambiguity finding followed by the construeagainst-the-lessee rule of construction to negate the troublesome ‘at the well’
language.”); see also W.W. McDonald Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 983 F. Supp.
2d 790, 807–08 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (noting that while the court would “normally
admit parol evidence to resolve [an] ambiguity,” it would rule in favor of the
lessor’s interpretation as a matter of law because under Estate of Tawney,
“ambiguities in oil and gas leases are construed against the lessee”).
114. 800 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2017).
115. Id. at 862.
116. Id. at 864; see Cather v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:17-CV-208, 2019 WL
3806629, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 13, 2019) (noting that while the court in Leggett
criticized its earlier opinions in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, “Wellman and
Tawney continue to have the same vitality and scope they have had since being
decided”); Kay Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:13-CV-151, 2017 WL 6403031, at
*1 (N.D.W. Va. July 11, 2017) (“[A]ny criticism of Tawney and Wellman
contained within Leggett is mere dicta and does not alter the current controlling
nature of those precedents.”). The leases at issue in Leggett were old flat-rate
leases. Previously, the West Virginia Legislature had statutorily declared that on
any flat-rate leases, the lessees must pay royalties on the basis of 1/8 of the amount
that they realized for their production at the wellhead. W. VA. CODE § 22-6-8(e)
(1994). After the supreme court in Leggett ruled that lessees could use a workback
methodology to calculate their amount realized at the wellhead, the West Virginia
Legislature amended the statute to require that on any flat-rate leases, lessees must
calculate their royalty payments on the basis of “one eighth of the gross proceeds,
free from any deductions for post-production expenses, received at the first point
of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser in an arm’s length transaction.” W.
VA. CODE § 22-6-8 (e) (2018).
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Whatever West Virginia may ultimately decide to do with its version
of the first marketable product doctrine, Estate of Tawney remains a
glaring example of an opinion that misapplies the “against the lessee” rule
of lease construction in a way that is inconsistent with the historical
limitations on the contra proferentem doctrine.
IV. A RETURN TO ITS CONTRA PROFERENTEM ROOTS: THE PROPER
SCOPE OF THE “AGAINST THE LESSEE” RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
Even in states that have not adopted the first marketable product
doctrine, courts have cited the “against the lessee” rule of construction so
frequently that a casual observer might conclude that it is the first and
foremost rule of construction in oil and gas lease disputes. As in all other
types of contract disputes, however, the first and foremost rule of
construction in lease disputes is to give effect to the parties’ intent,
which—more often than not—is reflected in the plain terms of the parties’
oil and gas lease. 117 Courts should have no need to resort to, or even cite
to, a rule of construction or other interpretive aid when the parties’ oil and
gas lease unambiguously reflects the parties’ intent. 118
If courts were to apply the “against the lessee” rule of construction
consistently with the contra proferentem doctrine, then they would
properly invoke the “against the lessee” rule only in rare cases—
specifically, only in those oil and gas lease disputes where (a) the relevant
lease language is truly ambiguous, and there is no extrinsic evidence
available to enable a fact finder to resolve the ambiguity as a matter of fact
and no other rule of construction available to enable a judge to resolve the
ambiguity as a matter of law; (b) the lessee actually drafted or is otherwise
responsible for the relevant lease language; and (c) there is a true disparity
in the bargaining power between the lessee and the lessor. 119
The “against the lessee” rule of construction is no justification for a
court automatically to conclude, “Lessor wins, and Lessee loses.”120 Even
in insurance cases, the contra proferentem doctrine does not automatically
mean, “Insured wins, and Insurer loses.”121 There is no sound reason for

117. See supra text accompanying note 11.
118. See supra text accompanying note 13.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 122–93.
120. In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp., 460 B.R. 470, 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2011); see Keeling, supra note 77, at 561 n.224.
121. See Kenneth Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95
MICH. L. REV. 531, 532 (1996) (noting that the contra proferentem rule is “not
merely a label for pro-coverage results reached for other reasons”).
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the “against the lessee” rule to apply differently in oil and gas cases than
the contra proferentem doctrine does in insurance cases.
A. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should Be a Rule of Last Resort
Generally, a court’s role in resolving a dispute over oil and gas lease
terms should be to construe the parties’ lease, not to rewrite it for the
parties. 122 The contra proferentem doctrine does not permit a court to
override the parties’ contractual intent if the court may divine the parties’
intent from the contract itself or from other available sources. 123 The same
should be true of the “against the lessee” rule. A court has no need to resort
to the “against the lessee” rule of construction where (a) the parties’ lease
is unambiguous, (b) a fact finder may construe the lease through extrinsic
evidence, or (c) the court may construe the lease through other relevant
rules of construction. 124 Many courts have correctly recognized that the
“against the lessee” rule of construction is a rule of last resort. 125
122. See David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the
Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10.01, at 10-2
(2002) (“Fundamental freedom of contract concepts require that courts enforce
the parties’ contract — not a contract of the court’s making.”).
123. See, e.g., Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957) (noting that the rule “is not applicable in the absence of
ambiguity, and even in its presence is never used a hypercritical and overly literal
tool to override the manifest object and purpose of the language of [the]
writings”); see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 55 (“When intent is obvious on the
face of the instrument, no resort to canons is justified.”).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
125. See, e.g., Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd., No. 1:12-CV424, 2013 WL 1289362, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2013) (“Like the rule of
contra proferentem, [the ‘against the lessee’ rule] is not designed to discern the
parties’ intent, and should only be applied as a tie-breaking rule.”); Pollock v.
Energy Corp. of Am., No. 10-1553, 2013 WL 275327, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
2013) (noting that the “against the lessee” rule is inapplicable where “there is no
ambiguity to resolve”); Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759,
774 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (noting that the “against the lessee” rule is “not to be applied
in a manner that creates a contract beyond the parties’ intent”); Roye Realty &
Dev., Inc. v. Watson, 2 P.3d 320, 329 (Okla. 1996) (“Although oil and gas leases
are to be construed against the lessee and in favor of the lessor, . . . the intention
of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone if possible. . . . A
fundamental precept of contract law in Oklahoma is that the law will not make a
better contract than the parties themselves entered.”); TSB Exco, Inc. v. E.N.
Smith, III Energy Corp., 818 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. App. 1991) (“The rule
requiring a construction against the lessee does not apply here. It applies only
when the contract is ambiguous.”).
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But as Rogers and Estate of Tawney illustrate, other courts have not
applied the “against the lessee” rule as a rule of last resort. 126 The decisions
in Rogers and Estate of Tawney are perhaps the inevitable extension of
case law which over the years has declared, without any apparent
exception or limitation, that courts must construe leases against their
lessees. 127 Absent any exceptions or limitations, the “against the lessee”
rule becomes a tool for abuse. 128 When courts do not recognize that the
“against the lessee” rule is a rule of last resort, then as in Rogers and Estate
of Tawney, they may try to use the rule as a means to rewrite an oil and
lease and dictate a result that is contrary to its plain terms. 129 The function
of the rule should be to resolve ambiguity, not to create ambiguity where
it otherwise does not exist.130
This is certainly true in interpreting oil and gas royalty clauses. 131 In
Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 132 a Michigan case predating Rogers and
Estate of Tawney, the plaintiff lessors complained that they had received
inadequate royalties under a clause requiring that the lessee calculate its
royalty payments on the basis of the “gross proceeds at the wellhead.”133
The court in Schroeder acknowledged that when a royalty clause is
ambiguous, a court may need to construe the clause in favor of the
lessor. 134 However, citing case law from other states holding that the term

126. See supra text accompanying notes 80–113.
127. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
128. See Pierce, supra note 35, at 919 (noting that courts often improperly
apply the “against the lessee” rule of construction to “support the desired outcome
even though there may be no need to resolve an ambiguity, or even a need to
interpret the express terms of the contract”).
129. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 42, at 1863 (noting that the contra
proferentem doctrine, if unfettered and not used as a rule of last resort, “provides
a cloak under which courts may exercise an inordinate amount of discretion. Since
all language is arguably ambiguous, courts are able to use the doctrine to dictate
results.”); Rappaport, supra note 88, at 225 (noting that the contra proferentem
doctrine, if unfettered and not used as a rule of last resort, may lead “judges to
stretch to find that harsh terms are ambiguous”); see also Fischer, supra note 55,
at 1005 (“Indeed, it is difficult to envision a term that cannot be deemed
‘ambiguous’ if the court so wishes.”).
130. See Fenice & Friedman, supra note 46, at 235.
131. See Rappaport, supra note 88, at 254 (“In general, the ambiguity rule is
no more attractive outside of insurance than within.”).
132. 565 N.W.2d 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
133. Id. at 890.
134. Id. at 892.
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“at the wellhead” is unambiguous, 135 the court concluded that the lessee in
Schroeder had properly used a workback methodology to calculate its
royalty payments on the basis of the value of its production at the
wellhead:
[T]o accede to plaintiffs’ interpretation of “gross proceeds at the
wellhead'' would be to require defendant to pay royalties to
plaintiffs, based not only on the value of the gas at the wellhead,
but also upon the costs that defendant has incurred to prepare the
gas for, and transport the gas to, market. Thus, plaintiffs’ royalties
would be increased merely as a function of defendant’s own
efforts to enhance the value of the gas through postproduction
investments that it has exclusively underwritten. We simply do not
believe that such an interpretation of the disputed term is more
compatible with either the plain language of the agreement or with
the logical expectations of the parties to the agreement. 136
The court noted that in the absence of any ambiguity, it had no need to
resort to any rules of contract construction.137
Especially in the oil and gas context, case law that applies common
lease terms should remain consistent and uniform. Schroeder was one of
a long line of cases holding that the term “at the well” is unambiguous.138
Rogers and Estate of Tawney rejected the Schroeder line of cases. The
Colorado Supreme Court in Rogers reasoned that the term “at the well”
was “silent with respect to allocation of costs,” acknowledging that its
opinion reflected a minority view. 139 The West Virginia Supreme Court in

135. Id. at 893–94 (citing, inter alia, Atl. Richfield Co. v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr.
683, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Merritt v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210,
214 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986)); see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
136. Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 894. The Michigan Legislature statutorily
abrogated Schroeder in 2000, when it enacted a statute that effectively codified a
version of the first marketable product doctrine. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
324.61503(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2017).
137. Schroeder, 565 N.W.2d at 896.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 74–75; see also Salzman & Friess,
supra note 10, at 7-11 (noting that up until Rogers and other first marketable
product cases, the phrase “at the well” was a term of art in oil and gas leases
meaning that “historically production was typically valued at the wellhead for
royalty purposes”).
139. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887, 901–02 (Colo. 2001).
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Estate of Tawney reasoned that the term “at the well” was ambiguous,140
citing its earlier opinion in Wellman, which concluded that Rogers and
other first marketable product cases were more “persuasive” than the older
Schroeder line of cases. 141
The “against the lessee” rule of construction creates particularly
confusing results when courts reject earlier case law finding a lease term
to be unambiguous. 142 Once an opinion like Rogers or Wellman suggests
that a lease term does not necessarily mean what prior courts have thought
it to mean, then the opinion may become a self-fulfilling prophecy,
inducing later courts to cite the split in case law as evidence that the lease
term is indeed ambiguous and that they should construe it in the lessor’s
favor. 143 In such an event, the “against the lessee” rule does exactly the
opposite of what it is supposed to do: Instead of resolving an ambiguity, it
creates an ambiguity—leaving oil and gas practitioners unclear about the
meaning of a lease term that they formerly believed to be clear and
unambiguous. 144
The “against the lessee” rule of construction should be a rule of last
resort, not a rule of first resort. If a court may construe a lease term as it is
written, then it should do so. 145 If a lease term has an accepted industry
meaning, then it is not ambiguous; and a court may enforce it consistently

140. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 28–29
(W. Va. 2006) (citing Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va.
2001)).
141. Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 264–65.
142. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 24, at 1123.
143. See Boardman, supra note 46, at 333 n.119; see also Boardman, supra
note 24, at 1123 (“[T]his follow-the-leader approach leads to awkward results
once a jurisdiction has already ruled that particular language is not ambiguous,
only to find a later split among the jurisdictions. . . . The somewhat random result
is that whether a term is considered ambiguous or not in a given jurisdiction may
turn on the order of decisions.”).
144. See Jake B. Ware, Note, Contractual Interpretations, Ambiguities, and
Litigation Difficulties Presented in the Context of Oil and Gas Leases as a Result
of the Texas Supreme Court’s Decision in Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co.-USA
v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2018), 5 ONE J. 795, 809 (2020) (noting that a
court may “create costly uncertainty in the interpretation of typical lease
agreements when they are not interpreted according to their industry definition”);
cf. Rappaport, supra note 88, at 202 (noting that the contra proferentem doctrine
creates uncertainty by making it harder for industry parties “to know for certain
that a term will be given its intended meaning”).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.
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with its industry meaning. 146 If a lease term is truly ambiguous, then a
court should first seek to determine what the parties actually intended it to
mean at the time that they entered into their oil and gas lease—either
through extrinsic evidence or other more specific rules of contract
construction. 147 Only then, if the court is unable to determine what the
parties actually intended the term to mean, should a court apply an
artificial rule of construction that favors one party’s construction over the
other’s. 148
As Professor Bruce Kramer has observed: “Canons when used as a
tool in the interpretive process are useful. Canons when used as a substitute
for the interpretational process are counter-productive.”149
B. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should Apply Only If the Lessee is the
Drafter
By definition, the contra proferentem doctrine assumes that the party
who drafted a contract is responsible for any ambiguous terms in the
contract. 150 Similarly, the “against the lessee” rule of construction rests on
the premise that the lessee is usually the drafter of an oil and gas lease and
in a better position to ensure that its terms are unambiguous. 151 Even today,
that premise is still frequently true. A lessee, through a landman, will often
146. See Ware, supra note 144, at 809–10; see also supra text accompanying
note 17.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 51.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 46–62.
149. Kramer, supra note 12, at 129.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 39–40.
151. See Rook v. James E. Russell Petroleum, Inc., 679 P.2d 158, 164 (Kan.
1984) (“Oil and gas leases containing ambiguities are to be strictly construed
against the lessee-producer and in favor of the lessor-royalty owner because the
lessee usually provides the lease form or dictates the terms thereof, and where the
lessee desires it may protect itself by the manner in which the lease is drawn.”)
(emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 32. The term “drafter”
does not mean that the lessee must literally have drafted or authored the
ambiguous language for the “against the lessee” rule to apply. Under the contra
proferentem doctrine, courts will deem that an insurer is the “drafter” of an
insurance policy if the policy is a form policy which the insurer presented to the
insured and which the insured signed without any negotiation or discussion. See
Rappaport, supra note 88, at 174. The same presumably would be true of the
“against the lessee” rule of construction. Courts will deem that a lessee is the
“drafter” of a lessee-friendly form lease which the lessee presented to the lessor
and which the lessor signed without any negotiation or discussion. E.g., Rook, 679
P.2d at 164.
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trigger lease discussions with prospective lessors by offering them a
lessee-friendly lease form; and often those prospective lessors will simply
sign the lease forms without any negotiation or debate. 152 As Professor
David Pierce has noted, lessors may react to lessee-friendly lease forms in
the same way that many people react to other form contracts, simply
asking: “How much and where do I sign?”153
But the fact that the lessee is usually the drafter of a lease does not
mean that the lessee is always the drafter of a lease. Over the years, lessors
have become increasingly more sophisticated. 154 While their
conversations with a landman may begin with a lessee-friendly form, they
may not end there. Many lessors engage oil and gas counsel to assist them
in their negotiations with lessees over the terms of an oil and gas lease.155
More and more commonly, lessors and their counsel either insist on their
own lessor-friendly lease forms or, through the negotiation process,
require that their lessees substantially revise lease terms that otherwise
would have favored the lessees. 156
Some courts have explicitly recognized that the “against the lessee”
rule applies only if the lessee drafted or was otherwise responsible for the
ambiguous lease term. 157 Indeed, consistent with the contra proferentem
doctrine and its presumption that a court should construe a contract against
its drafter, an “against the lessor” rule of construction may apply where
the lessor—rather than the lessee—is responsible for the ambiguous lease
term. 158 An example is Schwatken v. Explorer Resources, Inc. 159 The
lessors, Wilbur and Veva Schwatken, filed suit seeking a declaration that
their oil and gas lease with the lessee had expired. The lessee relied on
Paragraph 18 of the lease to argue that the lease remained in effect. 160 The
Kansas Court of Appeals stated:
152. Pierce, supra note 32, at 452.
153. Id. at 450 n.25.
154. Salzman & Friess, supra note 10, at 7-6.
155. Schwatken v. Explorer Res., Inc., 125 P.3d 1078 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).
156. Keeling, supra note 77, at 561 n.224; see Salzman & Friess, supra note
10, at 7-6 (“While historically [a] landman would typically lease acreage from
landowners on standard form contracts with little or no edits, today it is not
uncommon for lessors to negotiate each provision of the proposed oil and gas
lease, sometimes presenting either their own rider to the producer’s lease form or
their own separate lease form.”).
157. See, e.g., Camp Ne’er Too Late, LP v. Swepi, LP, 185 F. Supp. 3d 517,
549 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Schwatken, 125 P.3d at 1080.
158. See Camp Ne’er Too Late, LP, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 549; Schwatken, 125
P.3d at 1080.
159. 125 P.3d 1078 (2006).
160. Id. at 1080.
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While it is true that ambiguities in oil and gas leases ordinarily are
construed in favor of the lessor, . . . this is based on the fact that
the lessee is most often responsible for drafting the document.
Here, paragraph 18 was incorporated into the lease at the
insistence of the Schwatkens. Its absence would have been a dealbreaker for them . . . . Thus, paragraph 18 should be construed
strictly against the Schwatkens. 161
Nor should the “against the lessee” rule of construction apply where the
parties, through the negotiation process, collaborated or participated
equally in drafting the ambiguous lease term. 162 In Colburn v. Parker &
Parsley Development Co., 163 the parties disputed whether a salt water
disposal agreement required the lessee to pay the lessors for all salt water
that the lessee injected in a disposal well on the leased premises. 164 The
trial court applied the “against the lessee” rule and enforced the lessors’
construction of the salt water disposal agreement. 165 On appeal, the Kansas
Court of Appeals stated:
We do not agree with the trial court’s statement that the same rule
would apply to the construction of the saltwater disposal
agreement as to the construction of an oil and gas lease (strictly
against the lessee) . . . . A careful review of the record reveals both
parties participated equally in drafting and negotiating the final
written saltwater disposal agreement. “The general rule that
doubtful language in a contract is construed against the drafter is
of little consequence where the parties are of equal bargaining
power and have each had an opportunity to fully examine

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Wallis v. Dog Day, Inc., No. 107,896, 2014 WL 278704, at *1
(Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2014); Colburn v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Co., 842 P.2d
321, 328 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Devon Energy Prod. Co. v. Sheppard, No. 13-1900036-CV, 2020 WL 3478680, at *5 n.7 (Tex. App. 2020) (not designated for
publication); see also Kramer, supra note 12, at 116 (“The underlying rationale
for this canon is that the scrivener, who is usually the grantor, should be
responsible for the lack of clarity in the use of the language. . . . In cases where
the grantee is the scrivener, or both parties are equally responsible for the drafting
of the instrument, this canon should not apply.”).
163. 842 P.2d 321 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
164. Id. at 327.
165. Id. at 328.
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proposed contract provisions before the contract is executed.” 166
The court of appeals in Colburn emphasized that “[w]here an ambiguous
contract is prepared jointly and equally by the parties, it will not be
liberally or strictly construed against either party.”167
The “against the lessee” rule of construction is certainly not a blanket
rule that a court should blindly apply in every case involving a dispute
over the terms of an oil and gas lease. Like the contra proferentem
doctrine, the “against the lessee” rule necessarily presumes that a court
should construe an ambiguous term against the party who was actually
responsible or culpable for the ambiguous language.168 If the lessee did not
draft the ambiguous lease term, then the lessee was not actually
responsible or culpable for the ambiguous language. 169 Applying the
“against the lessee” rule in such a situation would mean that the rule is
simply a penal doctrine—a rule that punishes the lessee for the mere fact
that the parties’ oil and gas lease contains a term which a court deemed to
be ambiguous.170
The “against the lessee” rule of construction serves little useful
purpose when the lessee was not responsible or culpable for the ambiguous
lease term. 171 If the lessor drafted the ambiguous lease term, or even if the
lessor and lessee participated equally in drafting the ambiguous term, then
the ambiguous term was likely the product of negotiations between the
parties—in other words, the lessor likely rejected a lessee-friendly lease
form and entered into active negotiations with the lessee over the terms of
the lease. 172 In that event, the extrinsic evidence of their negotiation
process—and not some artificial rule of lease construction—would be far
166. Id. (quoting Wood River Pipeline Co. v. Willbros Energy Servs. Co., 738
P.2d 866, 867–68 (Kan. 1987)).
167. Id. (quoting Crestview Bowl, Inc. v. Womer Constr. Co., 592 P.2d 74, 75
(Kan. 1979)).
168. See supra text accompanying note 32.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 52–57.
170. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 55, at 1017; cf. Dzien & Turner, supra note
41, at 1129 (“[It] seems inequitable to interpret an ambiguity against an insurer
and in favor of coverage if the insured contributed to the ambiguity because of its
participation in the drafting process.”).
171. Fischer, supra note 55, at 1017.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 90–93. The contra proferentem
doctrine is a mandatory rule that the parties to a contract typically cannot disclaim.
See Leib & Thel, supra note 41, at 790. However, where a lease is the product of
extensive negotiations, a prudent lessee may wish to insist that the lease contain
a provision stating that both the lessee and the lessor participated equally in
drafting the lease.
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more helpful in revealing what the parties intended the disputed lease
language to mean. 173
Regardless, a court should not apply the “against the lessee” rule of
construction when the lessee did not draft—and was not otherwise
responsible or culpable for—the ambiguous lease term.
C. The “Against the Lessee” Rule Should Not Apply if the Lessor is
Sophisticated
At its essence, the contra proferentem doctrine seeks to protect
innocent parties who enter into form contracts or contracts of adhesion
with little or no ability to negotiate any of the terms of those contracts.174
But especially in the oil and gas context, sophisticated parties, such as
large companies or industry professionals, do not require the protection of
the contra proferentem doctrine: they may, and generally do, hire counsel
to assist them in negotiating the terms of their contracts. 175 Consequently,
many courts have ruled that the contra proferentem doctrine does not
apply where all of the parties to a transaction are sophisticated and equally
capable of negotiating favorable terms—whether or not they actually try
to do so. 176
Some courts have similarly concluded that the “against the lessee” rule
does not apply to oil and gas leases with sophisticated lessors.177 An
example is Dorchester Minerals, LP v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC.178
The lessor in that case, Dorchester Minerals, was a publicly-traded entity
with oil and gas interests in 25 states.179 Dorchester alleged that its lessee,
Chesapeake, had failed to pay gas royalties consistently with the terms of
the gas royalty clause in their leases. The parties offered competing
interpretations of the gas royalty clause. 180 Dorchester argued that the
district court should construe the gas royalty clause in Dorchester’s favor.
The district court disagreed, holding that the “against the lessee” rule—
like the contra proferentem doctrine—does not apply where the lessee and

173. See, e.g., BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 43, at § 3:59.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 90–93.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 58–62.
177. See, e.g., Dorchester Minerals, LP v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 215 F.
Supp. 3d 746, 755 (E.D. Ark. 2016); Colburn v. Parker & Parsley Dev. Co., 842
P.2d 321, 328 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
178. 215 F. Supp. 3d 746 (E.D. Ark. 2016).
179. Id. at 749.
180. Id. at 748–49.
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lessor are “equal in bargaining power” and equally capable of negotiating
favorable terms. 181
Other courts, such as the West Virginia Supreme Court in Estate of
Tawney, have concluded that the “against the lessee” rule applies even in
cases involving sophisticated lessors.182 The arguments they have offered
for this conclusion have varied, but among other things, these courts have
asserted (i) that even as to sophisticated lessors, the lessee bears the
responsibility to ensure that its leases are unambiguous,183 (ii) that even
sophisticated lessors are “often” at an “informational or technical
disadvantage” on oil and gas matters, 184 and (iii) that the very existence of
the “against the lessee” rule encourages oil and gas development by
warning a lessee that it may lose a lease if it unreasonably construes the
lease contrary to the interests of its lessors. 185
The courts that have declined to apply the “against the lessee” rule in
favor of sophisticated lessors have the better side of the debate. If the
“against the lessee” rule indeed rests on the same principles as the contra
proferentem doctrine, then the “against the lessee” rule necessarily
assumes that the drafter of an oil and gas lease is more culpable than the
non-drafter for the consequences of any ambiguous language. 186 This
assumption is inapposite in cases involving sophisticated lessors. 187 With
sophisticated lessors, an oil and gas lease is typically not an adhesion
contract or a “take it or leave it” transaction. Moreover, a court may fairly
presume that sophisticated lessors are familiar with—or have access to
information about—the meaning of any technical terms or other common
oil and gas industry terms.188
Whether the “against the lessee” rule of construction applies in favor
of a sophisticated lessor may not, or at least should not, matter in many
cases. If an oil and gas lease is unambiguous, then a court has no need to
apply the “against the lessee” rule of construction—whether the lessor is

181. Id. at 755.
182. See, e.g., N. Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Cont’l Res., Inc., No. CV 14-90-BLGCSO, 2016 WL 3079692, at *5 (D. Mont. May 31, 2016); Estate of Tawney v.
Columbia Nat. Res., L.L.C., 633 S.E.2d 22, 29–30 (W. Va. 2006); Energy Dev.
Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 144 (W. Va. 2003); see also supra text
accompanying notes 102–03.
183. See, e.g., Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 29–30.
184. Energy Dev. Corp., 591 S.E.2d at 144.
185. See, e.g., N. Oil & Gas, Inc., 2016 WL 3079692, at *5.
186. See supra text accompanying note 32.
187. See Ostrager & Ichel, supra note 60, at 583.
188. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 391.
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sophisticated or not. 189 If any disputed terms in the lease are oil and gas
industry terms that have a common technical meaning, then a court may
enforce those terms consistently with their common technical meaning.190
If, as is certainly possible in cases involving sophisticated lessors, the
parties engaged in negotiations over the terms of the lease, then a court—
or a jury—may consider any extrinsic evidence of the parties’
negotiations, or any extrinsic evidence of a course of dealing or a usage of
trade, to determine the parties’ contractual intent. 191
Even in those rare cases where it may matter, there is little justification
for a court simply to declare, “Lessor wins.” If a lessee and a sophisticated
lessor dispute the meaning of a lease term that is truly ambiguous—i.e.,
that is reasonably susceptible to two or more meanings—then a court need
not use an artificial rule of construction to resolve the dispute. Instead, it
may properly treat the dispute as a fact issue. Unlike an unsophisticated
lessor or a typical non-drafting party under a contract of adhesion, a
sophisticated lessor presumably at least read the provisions of its oil and
gas lease before signing it. Consequently, a sophisticated lessor
presumably is capable of speaking for itself at a trial on the merits. 192 Both
the lessee and the lessor may testify to their respective understanding of
the disputed ambiguous term, and a jury or other fact finder may determine
which of the two interpretations is the correct one. 193

189. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15.
190. See supra text accompanying note 17.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 20–23; cf. Miller, supra note 42, at
1865 (“Such proof would be relatively simple to show with respect to corporate
insureds since businesses that seek insurance are generally either familiar with the
usage of particular terms within the insurance world or may be charged with such
knowledge because of their ability to bargain over terms.”).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 91–93.
193. Courts in some states may instruct a jury on the contra proferentem
doctrine and advise it that it may, in its discretion, construe a contract against the
drafter. See Leib & Thel, supra note 41, at 784. In those rare cases in which the
“against the lessee” rule of construction actually applies, it would seem more
appropriate for a court to apply the rule than a jury: if there is no extrinsic evidence
or other evidence of the parties’ contractual intent, then there is likely no issue of
“fact” for a jury to resolve. Even in those cases in which a lessee and a
sophisticated lessor dispute the meaning of an ambiguous lease, a court should
not instruct the jury that it may construe the lease against the lessee. In a dispute
between equally sophisticated parties, any such instruction would not serve the
purpose of balancing any inequity in bargaining power; instead, any such
instruction would only serve the improper purpose of tilting or nudging the jury
in favor of one party over the other.
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Like the contra proferentem doctrine, the “against the lessee” rule of
construction should be a rule of limited application. It serves no useful
purpose in a dispute between a sophisticated lessee and lessor.
CONCLUSION
In lawsuits arising from oil and gas leases, courts often recite the
“against the lessee” rule of construction as if it were a truism, giving little
regard for whether the rule is actually relevant. Even worse, some courts—
most notably, in cases involving the first marketable product doctrine—
have invoked the “against the lessee” rule to achieve a result that is
contrary to the plain meaning of common oil and gas terms. But if the
“against the lessee” rule of construction is indeed merely an oil and gas
variation on the contra proferentem doctrine, then it is not, and should not
be, a hard-and-fast rule. Instead, consistent with the contra proferentem
doctrine, the “against the lessee” rule should be a rule of limited
application—with many exceptions.
Like the contra proferentem doctrine, the “against the lessee” rule of
construction should be a rule of last resort. It should apply only in disputes
arising from ambiguous lease language. It should apply only when no
other rule of construction is available to enable a court to resolve the
ambiguity as a matter of law. It should apply only when there is no
extrinsic evidence available to enable a fact finder to resolve the ambiguity
as a matter of fact. It should apply only when the lessee is responsible for
the ambiguous language. It should apply only when the lessor is
unsophisticated and has no practical ability to negotiate any alternative
language. There is no justification for courts to apply the “against the
lessee” rule more broadly than the contra proferentem doctrine. There
certainly is no justification for courts to apply the “against the lessee” rule
for the purpose of rewriting a lease to say something other than what it
actually says.

